



NEWSLETTER ON WOMEN & CHILD RIGHTS



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PREFACE

“I measure the progress of a community by the degree of progress which women have achieved.”

-DR. B.R. AMBEDKAR

ANBAY LEGAL is releasing its 11th Volume of monthly newsletter on rights of women and children. The aim is to publish compilations of landmark judgements passed by the Apex Court and High Courts in India, which bring to light various issues that affect women and children and to start a conversation on such matters. This newsletter is for the duration of May-December,2023 and includes all the major judgements and orders passed by the Supreme Court of India and various High Courts in the months between May- December, 2023. The newsletters for the year 2024 will be published quarterly.

About Anbay Legal

ANBAY LEGAL is a full-service firm having its office in New Delhi and Lucknow. We are a team of dedicated lawyers, including professionals from allied fields to meet the needs of corporates and individuals. We believe in a high standard of ethical values and honesty with our clients, with a commitment to provide high-quality legal advice and solutions in a time-bound manner.

About the theme

The theme chosen for this newsletter has been done keeping in mind the necessity behind openly talking about these issues. We don't require a special occasion or platform to raise our voice. Through these judgements we would like to highlight the number of cases that come up daily before the Hon'ble courts for adjudication and how we are taking small steps towards positive change through these landmark judgments.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

We would like to extend our deepest gratitude to Mr. Ashutosh Kumar Mishra, Managing Partner, Anbay Legal, who through his idea gave us the opportunity to work on such an interesting theme and cover contemporary issues.

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Lastly, we would like to express our appreciation for all the legal interns including Mr. Rajat Shandilya, Ms. Pratibha, Mr. Ashish Chandra, Mr. Rahul Kushwaha and Ms. Bhavya Yadav of Anbay Legal, who have contributed towards the compilation of the Newsletter.

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SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

**Bachpan Bachao Andolan v. Union of
India**



**BACHPAND BACHAO ANDOLAN V. UNION OF
INDIA
CIVIL APPEAL 2012 OF 2012**

TOPIC: POCSO

DATE OF ORDER/JUDGEMENT: 18/08/2023

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

In this case, A victim who endured a challenging journey seeking justice under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 in India. The victim faced significant struggles during the police investigation and court processes, experiencing revictimization and severe hardships at various stages. Recognizing the need for support for victims, especially children, the POCSO Rules, 2020, institutionalized the role of a 'support person.' The support person plays a crucial role in providing information, emotional and psychological support, and practical assistance to aid in the recovery of the child. The court emphasizes that justice in cases of crimes against children goes beyond apprehending and punishing the offender; it includes providing support, care, and security to the victim or vulnerable witness throughout the investigation and trial. The court stresses the importance of bringing victims back to society, making them feel secure, and restoring their worth and dignity.

In furtherance of Section 39 of the POCSO Act, the court directs the Principal Secretary to the Department of Women and Child Welfare in the State of Uttar Pradesh to convene a meeting within six weeks. The purpose of this meeting is to assess the state's capabilities regarding the support persons' ecosystem, including selection, appointment, training, career advancement, and terms and conditions of employment. The meeting involves key authorities such as the Chairperson of the State Commission for the Protection of Child Rights, Secretary of the State Legal Service Authority, senior-most Presidents of a Juvenile Justice Board and Chairperson of a Child Welfare Committee, and a representative from the State

Commission for Women. The court outlines specific actions, including gathering details from District Child Protection Units, framing rules and guidelines for the educational qualifications and training of support persons, conducting periodic training, implementing reporting mechanisms, preparing a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), and ensuring communication of guidelines to relevant authorities. Additionally, the court acknowledges the importance of adequate remuneration for independent trained professionals serving as support persons. While the Rules suggest payment equivalent to a skilled worker under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, the court suggests that remuneration should be commensurate with qualifications and experience, considering salaries paid to comparable government employees.

DECISION OF THE COURT

In this case, the court observed that from the point of registering an FIR/complaint under the POCSO Act, the victim and their family are required to interact with the police machinery, medical officers and hospitals, the Magistrate, Special Court and/or Juvenile Justice Board, the concerned Child Welfare Committee, and other stakeholders – which in itself can be daunting and overwhelming (over and above the already traumatic experience of the crime itself), often dissuading them from pursuing the case altogether. The victim, in the case at hand, faced painstaking struggle for justice while navigating the police, investigation stage, and court processes, for the prosecution of an offence under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. At numerous stages, she was revictimized, and faced severe hardships. In crimes against children, it is not only the initiating horror or +trauma that is deeply scarring; that is aggravated by the lack of support and handholding in the days that follow. In such crimes, true justice is achieved not merely by nabbing the culprit and bringing him to justice, or the severity of punishment meted out, but the support, care, and security to the victim (or vulnerable witness), as provided by the state and all its authorities in assuring a

painless, as less an ordeal an experience as is possible, during the entire process of investigation, and trial. The support and care provided through state institutions and offices is vital during this period. Furthermore, justice can be said to have been approximated only when the victims are brought back to society, made to feel secure, their worth and dignity, restored. Without this, justice is an empty phrase, an illusion.





HIGH COURT OF DELHI

- **Anish Pramod Patel v. Kiran Jyot Maini**
- **Aditya Vikram Kansagra v. Perry Kansagra**
- **Shanthakumari v. Thimmegowda**
- **S v. State**
- **Minor L v. State**
- **S. Rajdurai v. State (NCT of Delhi)**



**ANISH PRAMOD PATEL v. KIRAN JYOT
MAINI (2023 SCC OnLine Del 7605)**

TOPIC: Domestic Violence

DATE OF ORDER/JUDGEMENT: 01/12/2023

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

This marriage between the petitioner-husband and the respondent-wife was solemnized on 30-04-2015. Subsequently, on a complaint by the wife, an FIR was registered u/s 498-A, 323 and 504 of the Penal Code, 1860 and Sec. 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

Further, the wife had filed an application u/s 12 of the DV Act and an application for interim maintenance u/s 23 of the DV Act. The Judicial Magistrate vide order dated 10-05-2018 directed the husband to pay interim maintenance of Rs. 35,000 to the wife. Subsequently, the order was modified and vide order dated 01-02-2019, husband was directed to pay Rs. 45,000 to the wife and Rs. 55,000 per month to the daughter. Subsequently, the wife filed an application u/s 31(1) of the DV Act against the husband for non-compliance of order dated 01-02-2019 for non-payment of interim maintenance and summons were issued vide impugned order dated 12-03-2019. However, the husband challenged the summons u/s 482, CrPC and the summons were stayed. Further, the application was withdrawn u/s 482, CrPC from Allahabad High Court pursuant to transfer of cases from Uttar Pradesh to Delhi. The husband had approached the present court assailing the order dated 12-03-2019 passed u/s 31(1) of the DV Act. The husband stated that since the wife's grievance was that the order granting interim maintenance u/s 20 of the DV Act r/w Section 23 of the DV Act was not being complied with, the husband could not be summoned u/s 31 of the DV Act as the said provision only governed cases of breach of protection or interim protection order, and the same does not cover monetary reliefs under its ambit.

DECISION OF THE COURT:

The Court opined that due to transfer of cases from one State to another, a pending application under Section 482 of CrPC became infructuous and was withdrawn from one High Court and was immediately thereafter filed before the present Court, therefore the present petition was maintainable.

The Court noted that in the present case, vide impugned order 12-03-2019, the husband was summoned as accused under Section 31(1) of the DV Act pursuant to a complaint filed by the wife whereby she alleged that despite their being orders of the Magistrate and Sessions Court granting her an interim maintenance, the husband had failed to comply with the same and thus he was liable to be summoned and punished under Section 31(1) of the DV Act and further under Section 498-A of the IPC. The Court opined that as per statutory framework of the DV Act, the order which granted maintenance or interim maintenance under Section 20 of the DV Act as monetary relief to the aggrieved women would have to be enforced in the manner as provided under Section 20(6) of the DV Act or otherwise as per provisions as per the provisions of CrPC including manner of enforcement of orders passed under Section 125 of the CrPC.

The Court relied on *Velayudhan Nair v. Karthiayani*, 2012 SCC OnLine Ker 6976 saying that Section 31 of the DV Act could not be invoked for breach of order which granted maintenance and opined that Section 31 of the DV Act exclusively dealt with breach of 'protection order' or 'interim protection order' and an order granting maintenance in an application filed under Section 12 of the DV Act, which was an order passed under Section 20 of the DV Act, could not be interpreted to fall within the ambit of term 'protection order' as used in Section 31 of the DV Act.

The Court opined that the person could not be summoned under Section 31 of the DV Act for non-compliance of monetary order for payment of maintenance passed under

Section 20 of the DV Act. Thus, the petitioner could not be summoned as an accused under Section 31 of the DV Act and quashed the impugned order dated 12-03-2019.

ADITYA VIKRAM KANSAGRA v. PERRY KANSAGRA
2023 SCC OnLine Del 6424

TOPIC: Maintenance

DATE OF ORDER/JUDGMENT: 12/10/2023

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE: Appellant 1 was the wife of the respondent and Appellant 2 was the son of the respondent, filed the subject proceedings under Section 18 and 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 and the Family Court held that the appellants had filed a suit under Sections 18 and 20 of the Act and ad valorem Court fee was payable in terms of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act, 1870. The question before the Court was whether ad valorem court fee was payable on a claim for maintenance filed under Sections 18 and 20 of the Act.

DECISION OF THE COURT: Court opined that in the present case, the Family Court had not applied the ratio laid down in Mamta Case, because the Division Bench had referred to Rule 7 of the Rajasthan High Court Family Court Rules, 1994 and there was no such rule framed by the Delhi High Court. The Court opined that the Family Court had erred in not appreciating that the ratio laid down in Mamta case. The Court opined that “in Mamta case and Balwinder Singh case the ratio is that the object of the Family Courts Act, 1984 was to set up a forum for settlement of family disputes with due emphasis on conciliation and achieving socially desirable results and further to eliminate the rigid rules of procedure and evidence.” The Court opined that the Family Courts Act, 1984 was enacted pursuant to the 59th Report of the Law Commission, and the Family Court Act tried to simplify the rules of evidence and procedure to enable a Family Court to deal effectively. Thus, the Court relied on

Karbhari Vithoba v. Anusuya Karbhari 1956 SCC OnLine Bom 97 and Srikant Chand v. Mt. Ram Mohini 1957 SCC OnLine Pat 234 and held that the proceedings under Sections 18 and 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act were not suits, they were the proceedings on which fixed court fee of Re. 1.25p would be paid and ad valorem court fee was not liable to be paid. Accordingly, the Court set aside the order dated 22-02-2020 passed by the Family Court.

SHANTHAKUMARI v. THIMMEGOWDA

2023 SCC OnLine Kar 66

TOPIC: Maintenance

DATE OF ORDER/JUDGMENT: 19/09/2023

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE: The petitioner had filed the petition under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act claiming protection order under Section 18, residential order under Section 19 and monetary benefit under Section 20 in the form of maintenance of Rs.3,000/- per month and compensation of Rs.25,000/- under Section 22. After appreciating the oral and documentary evidence, the Magistrate granted a protection order under Section 18 of the Domestic Violence Act and he also awarded maintenance of Rs.1,500/- to the petitioner with Rs.1,000/- towards rent allowance and awarded Rs.5,000/- towards compensation. The afore-stated order was challenged by the husband and the Sessions Judge after re-appreciating the evidence, set aside the order of the Magistrate. The aggrieved wife thus filed the instant revision petition. Counsel for the petitioner argued that the revision petition should be allowed as the petitioner is a legally wedded wife of respondent and it is the duty of husband to maintain his wife. It was asserted that since the husband is having an illicit relationship with his relative, domestic violence is required to be inferred.

DECISION OF THE COURT: The Court noted that the specific contention of the respondent husband is that the petitioner has eloped with a neighbor. The Court also noted that the couple are now divorced and the same has not been challenged by the wife. The Court also took note of the oral and documentary evidence and pointed out that it clearly establishes that the petitioner is not honest towards her husband. The Court opined that since the petitioner is claiming maintenance, she must prove that she is honest and when she herself is not honest, she cannot pin-point her fingers towards her husband. The Court also pointed out that the Magistrate had failed to appreciate the aspects of the case and in a mechanical way, awarded the maintenance and compensation, which is a perverse order. The Sessions Judge on the other hand has re-appreciated the oral and documentary evidence and has rightly rejected the claim of the petitioner because she was leading an adulterous life.

S v. STATE

2023 SCC OnLine Del 6476

TOPIC: Rape

DATE OF ORDER/JUDGMENT: 12/10/2023

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE:

A revision petition was filed by the petitioner under Sections 397, 401 read with Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 assailing the order on charge dated 15-02-2023 passed by Additional Sessions Judge and seeking framing of charges for offences punishable under Sections 376, 323, 354, 354-B, 506 and 34 of Penal Code, 1860 in case arising out of FIR No. 43/2019, registered at Police Station Paschim Vihar East, Delhi for offences punishable under Sections 323, 354, 354-B, 509, 506 and 34 of IPC. Swarana Kanta Sharma, J., sets aside the impugned order to the extent whereby respondent 2 was discharged under Section 376 of IPC and respondents 4 and 5 were discharged under Section 323 and 34 of IPC. A PCR call was received

regarding a quarrel between the prosecutrix and respondent 2 (accused). Thereafter, the prosecutrix and her sister-in-law were taken for medical examination and their MLCs were recorded giving an account of the incident. However, the matter was then compromised. Later, a complaint was filed by the prosecutrix against respondent 2 on charges of attempt to rape and threatened to kill along with other similar allegations. Thus, the FIR was filed. The statements were recorded, and a charge sheet was filed. The allegations against respondent 2 were under Sections 323, 354, 354-B, 376, 506, 509 and 34 of IPC, against respondent 3 were under Sections 323, 354, 354-B, 506, 509 and 34 of IPC, against respondents 4 and 5 were under Sections 323, 506 and 34 of IPC.

The issue under consideration is whether the result of a polygraph test can become ground of discharge of an accused at stage of charge and could the learned Judge while passing order on application for grant of anticipatory bail, pass an order suggesting to the IO to conduct polygraph test of accused and victim to ascertain the truth of the matter without there being a prayer by accused or prosecution....

DECISION OF THE CASE:

The Court observed that discharging an accused primarily on the basis of the outcome of the polygraph test at the stage of charge was equally erroneous. The result of the polygraph test at best could have been considered as a part of the investigation and tested during trial on the touchstone of testimonies of the prosecutrix and other witnesses since the polygraph test result by itself is not a piece of independent evidence. The statement of the witnesses, the complainant, and the defence of the accused and their veracity has never been viewed as technical issues. Judicial determinations are made after appreciation of evidence before the Court, at the stage of charge by forming a prima facie view, and at the final stages of trial by determination as to whether or not the charge is proved beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court concluded that a probable truth or a probable lie, presented to the Court through a polygraph test report when neither any medical/expert witness nor the prosecutrix or other witnesses, or electronic evidence etc. had been brought on record by way of their examination, the MLCs and the statements of the prosecutrix and the witnesses under Section 161 CrPC and Section 164 CrPC were to be made basis of order on charge and a polygraph test report could not have substituted the said material on record.

MINOR L V. STATE

2023 SCC OnLine Del 7159

TOPIC: POCSO

DATE OF ORDER/JUDGMENT: 04/11/2023

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE:

In the present case, vide order dated 03-11-2023, this Court had directed the Medical Board constituted at Guru Teg Bahadur Hospital, Delhi, to examine the petitioner, victim child on 04-11-2023 to assess as to whether the medical termination of pregnancy would carry a risk to petitioner's life at the stage of gestational period of her pregnancy. Swarana Kanta Sharma, J., opined that the Medical Board should seek petitioner's opinion once again and in case she and her guardian were willing for medical termination of pregnancy and the Medical Board found it a fit case for the same, medical termination of pregnancy of petitioner should be conducted. The Court directed the Medical Board to explain the pros and cons of the medical termination of pregnancy, as well as pros and cons of continuing with the pregnancy if any, to petitioner and her guardian in Hindi which was her mother tongue so that there was no miscommunication.

DECISION OF THE COURT:

The Court directed the Medical Board to explain the pros and cons of the medical termination of pregnancy, as well as pros and cons of continuing with the pregnancy if any, to petitioner and her guardian in Hindi which was her mother tongue so that there was no miscommunication. The communication so made and the consent whether in affirmative or negative of petitioner and her guardian should also be obtained in her mother tongue, Hindi on the medical examination report.

The Court also ordered that henceforth, in cases of medical termination of pregnancy in rape cases, the pros and cons of the medical termination of pregnancy would be explained in Hindi wherever the victim and her guardian in case of a minor victim understands Hindi, or English where they understand the said language as explanation of the above in the language spoken and understood by the victim and her guardian were of utmost importance. The Court further directed that every endeavour must be made by the investigating officer and the Medical Board that the abovesaid was explained in the language spoken and understood by the victim and her guardian.

S. RAJDURAI V. STATE (NCT OF DELHI)

2023 SCC OnLine Del 5919

TOPIC: Rape

DATE OF ORDER/JUDGMENT: 13/09/2023

BACKGROUND OF CASE:

On 13-10-2022, the FIR was registered based on the complaint filed by Respondent 2 who stated that the petitioner had met her for the first time in September 2021 and had promised to marry her and on false promise of marriage, the petitioner forcibly developed physical relations with her. After a month, the parties prepared an agreement for live-in-relationship in which the petitioner mentioned himself as bachelor. Respondent 2 further stated that she made the petitioner meet her parents and when she requested to meet the petitioner's parents, the petitioner always made excuses. In May 2022, Respondent 2 came to know that the petitioner was already married and had concealed this fact from her. Thereafter, the petitioner promised Respondent 2 that he had already applied for divorce from his wife and would divorce her within six months. Thus, both of them continued their relationship and it was alleged on 29-4-2022, that the petitioner visited her, and he intentionally fought with her and forcibly made physical relationship with her on the pretext that he would marry her soon. Thereafter, Respondent 2 became pregnant, but the petitioner stopped attending Respondent 2's phone call. Thus, Respondent 2 filed the complaint and got the FIR registered. Thereafter, the petitioner filed the present petition to quash the impugned FIR and stated that Respondent 2 was already married and had a child and the pretext of being estranged from her husband, Respondent 2 had chased the petitioner and had enmeshed the fact that the petitioner was staying away from his wife. The petitioner further stated that Respondent 2 herself drafted the live-in-relationship agreement and forged the petitioner's signature. The petitioner contended that when he refused to live with Respondent 2, she got furious and filed a complaint with his superiors. The petitioner further contended that when she failed to live with him and her attempt to threaten the petitioner's wife did not succeed, she filed the complaint.

DECISION OF THE COURT:

The Court observed that a critical aspect of the case was Respondent 2's marital status as she was not legally divorced and thus the petitioner could not have entered into a legal marriage with Respondent 2. Consequently, there was no valid basis for Respondent 2 to entertain the notion of a marriage from the petitioner, as she by virtue of her existing marriage was ineligible to marry the petitioner. The Court held that for the offences mentioned in FIR, there was nothing in record to suggest the commission of offences under Sections 427, 509 and 506 of the IPC. Also, the Trial Court in its order dated 10-04-2023 framed charge only under Section 376 of IPC against the petitioner. Thus, the Court quashed the impugned FIR registered for offences under Sections 376, 323, 506, 509 and 427 of the IPC and accordingly, dismissed the petition.

ANBAY LEGAL



HIGH COURT OF PATNA

- Rudra Maya Singh v. Registrar General and Ors.



RUDRA MAYA SINGH v. REGISTRAR GENERAL AND ORS.

(Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.7594 of 2023)

TOPIC: FAMILY PENSION FOR WOMEN

DATE OF ORDER/JUDGEMENT: 13/12/2023

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE :

The petitioner asserted that she was the wife of the late Ram Kishore Prasad Sinha, who served as a judicial magistrate for a period of 13 years. According to the petitioner, her husband was granted a five-year extension after retirement and eventually retired in May 1963. The Court inferred that Sinha passed away on June 20, 1989, while still receiving a pension. It pointed out that the petitioner's reliance on a passport and Aadhaar card, both issued long after the death of her husband, lacked relevance. These documents did not establish the petitioner's husband's service in the judicial sector.

DECISION OF THE COURT :

"We see from the Bihar Pension Rules, 1950 that the provision for family pension was introduced with effect from 1st April 1964 vide Family Pension Scheme for State Government Employees, 1964, before the death of the pensioner. The claim made now after more than 30 years is grossly delayed," the Court noted.

Consequently, the Court rejected the plea.



HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH

- In Reference Received from Sessions Judge,
Raisen (M.P.) v. Jitendra Uikey



IN REFERENCE RECEIVED FROM SESSIONS JUDGE, RAISEN (M.P.) V. JITENDRA UIKEY

2023 SCC OnLine MP 2274

TOPIC: POCSO

DATE OF ORDER/JUDGMENT: 01/08/2023

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE:

The instant matter pertains to the disposal of death reference and a criminal appeal arising from a judgment dated 27-10-2018, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Gauharganj District Raisen. The prosecution's case revolved around the disappearance of a minor girl on 13.08.2018, her subsequent rape and murder, and the recovery of her body based on the appellant's statement under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872. The appellant was convicted and sentenced for various offenses including under Sections 366, 376(2)(j), 376(2)(m), 376-AB, 376-A, 302, 201 of the Penal Code, 1860 and Section 5(n), (6) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012.

DECISION OF THE COURT:

The court partly allowed the appeal and modified the sentences. The Court affirmed the appellant's convictions, but the death sentences were commuted to life imprisonment without the possibility of remission. The Court further confirmed other terms of sentences and held that all the substantive sentences would run concurrently.



HIGH COURT OF TELANGANA

- **Badak Singh V. The State of
Telangana**



BADAK SINGH V. THE STATE OF TELANGANA

CIVIL APPEAL 2012 OF 2012

TOPIC: POCSO ACT

DATE OF ORDER/JUDGEMENT: 29/11/2023

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

In this case, The Criminal Appeal arises from a conviction under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. The appellant, accused of an offence under Section 7 read with Section 8 of the Act, was sentenced to three years of rigorous imprisonment. The victim, a sixth-grade student, alleged that the appellant assaulted her. The defence argued inconsistencies and improvements in witness testimonies during the trial, questioning the victim's credibility and citing discrepancies in the scene of the offence. The defence contended that the evidence lacked proof of the accused's sexual intent and questioned the delay in recording the victim's statement under Section 164 Cr. P.C. Additionally, the defence presented witnesses alleging a quarrel between the victim's father and the appellant, suggesting a false complaint. Despite these arguments, the court upheld the conviction, emphasizing the consistent core of the victim's account of the assault during a nature call. The court deemed minor discrepancies immaterial and asserted the improbability of false accusations by a parent against a young child. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, affirming the trial court's judgment and directing the accused to serve the remaining sentence in prison.

DECISION OF THE COURT

In this case, the contradictions would not discredit the narration of the victim girl. The said version is consistent both in the statement made during the investigation and also before the Court. Though the witnesses were cross-examined extensively, the basic version of the victim going to answer a nature call and the appellant lying is consistent. Though several contradictions were brought on record regarding the statements made and the scene of offence, such minor discrepancies will not affect the version of the victim girl. Justice Surender noted that although several contradictions surfaced during the cross-examination, no child would have been able to narrate her version with such clarity and endure the cross-examination if the incident had not actually taken place. No parent would go to the extent of falsely implicating a person stating that the 7-year-old child was abused. A seven-year-old girl would not speak with such clarity and withstand cross examination, if the incident had not taken place. In view of the above facts and circumstances, there are no grounds to interfere with the judgment of the trial Court.

TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

<u>S.No.</u>	<u>Abbreviations</u>	<u>Definition</u>
1.	C.M.P	Civil Miscellaneous Petition
2.	C.R.P. (PD)	Civil Revision Petition (PD)
3.	Cr.P.C.	Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
4.	F.I.R.	First Information Report
5.	I.P.C.	Indian Penal Code, 1860
6.	DLSA	District Legal Service Authority
7.	DSLSA	Delhi State Legal Service Authority
8.	DVC Scheme	Delhi Victim Compensation Scheme
9.	DP Act	Dowry Prohibition Act.
10.	JJ Act	Juvenile Justice Act
11.	POCSO Act	Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012
12.	S.L.P.	Special Leave Petition
13.	W.P. (C)	Writ Petition (Civil)
14.	W.P. (Crl)	Writ Petition (Criminal)

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